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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

**SECRET**  
Security Information

April 28, 1953

Dear Allen:-

I hope you won't mind my mentioning a few more points concerning the forthcoming "World Peace Council" in Budapest which was discussed at the PSB meeting last week. In view of the urgency of the matter itself and the limited time in which to act, I wanted to send you this interim note rather than wait until next Thursday to explore further.

As you know, the Communists have extended invitations to U.S. press agencies in Europe to send reporters to cover the affair. If the U.S. Government refuses to validate the passports of the people invited, the "iron curtain" epithet will be turned against us, and the meeting is almost certain to be covered by nationals of other countries of the free world, which would cause a very unfavorable reaction, particularly among newspapermen. It would be desirable to make the validations in any event, but preferably after diplomatic negotiations with the Hungarian Government for a guarantee against imprisonment.

Coming so soon after the President's speech, the meeting may assume major significance in Soviet strategy. Budapest is of particular importance as a meeting place in view of the reported spontaneous, friendly reaction by the Hungarian people to the words of the President. A brief relaxation of the curtain as in the case of the U.S. editors in Moscow last month, coupled with a post-Stalin new look for Soviet "peace" propaganda, might catch the imagination of a large number of people and might regain the initiative for the Kremlin.

Decision concerning action is, of course, within your province and that of the Department of State. If possible, contact should be made at once on a confidential basis (outside ordinary channels if necessary) with the American press bureaus in Paris or their offices in the U.S. to enlist the cooperation of one or more reporter-invitees. While in Budapest such individuals could write and try to file copy favorable to the President's policy and unfavorable to the Communist line, or at least they could make observations that would form the basis for publication after their return to this side of the curtain.

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
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An unorthodox situation like this cannot be turned against the Communists if orthodox thinking regarding personal safety and nicety of operation controls decisions. The Communists are unlikely to be foolish enough to arrest one of the guests, but if they should it would redound to their own considerable detriment.

I am sure that you have thought of a number of ways to exploit this sort of meeting, and hope you won't mind these suggestions.

All the best,



25X1

Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
2430 E Street N.W.  
Washington, D. C.

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Christian Science  
Monitor

APR 29 1953

## Dollars for MIGs

Military and technical intelligence can be bought. But good will and genuine respect cannot.

In a cold war it is often necessary to pay for information smuggled from the opposing side. But in a propaganda war it is important not to give seeming support to charges made by the opposing side.

It is often charged by Communists and accepted even in some friendly nations that the United States expects to buy control of the world with dollars. It is also charged that the United States is not sincere in saying that it wants negotiated peace in Korea or elsewhere, and is only play-acting at Panmunjom.

Preposterous as these charges are to anyone who knows the real temper of the American people and the considered purposes of American policy, there are millions of people throughout the world who are not in a position to recognize their preposterousness. For this reason we question seriously the timing of the offer of \$100,000 for the first Russian-built jet plane that a Communist pilot will deliver to the Allies in the Far East.

The announcement was made when the Panmunjom talks were only three days old. This is not the sort of "pressure" likely to hasten agreement. An army spokesman in Tokyo states that the offer is aimed to obtain "invaluable technical intelligence" and to sow suspicion through the Red Air Force. However, it has been publicly stated that the Polish flier, Lt. Franciszek Jarewski, who recently flew a MIG-15 to Denmark acted on "patriotic" rather than mercenary motives—and the new offer could as easily sow suspicion among neutrals and friendly peoples as among Communist airmen.

Since it has been made, we believe it is incumbent on Washington to make doubly clear to the world the good faith with which it has approached the Panmunjom talks and the larger issues of peace now in the air. That good faith — abundantly clear to all who know the President's positions—can speak louder than the dollar sign to peoples in doubt.

New York Times

APR 30 1953

## U. S. Offer for MIG Ridiculed

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.  
BERLIN, April 29 — Neues Deutschland, East Berlin's official Communist newspaper, ridiculed today the United States offer of a \$100,000 reward for the first delivery of a Soviet-made MIG-15 jet plane in Korea. "How much American aircraft industry must have gone to the dogs!" it said, if United States authorities are so eager to get a close look at a MIG-15.

New York

Herald Tribune

APR 30 1953

## Dollars for MiGs

The use of hard cash in cloak-and-dagger activities is an old practice; but there was something novel (and a little disconcerting) in General Clark's offer of \$50,000 to each Communist pilot in Korea who would fly a MiG to our side of the lines. The offer could be taken—as it is evidently being taken in some circles abroad—as an indication that the United States believes everything can be bought with dollars. As psychological warfare the project undoubtedly has merit; one can readily conceive a certain uneasiness being thrown into the Communist air force, with pilots keeping watch on each other to make sure that none escapes to freedom and a fortune. The scientific value of a captured MiG would, moreover, be considerable, despite the fact that one was recently brought down by an escaping pilot in Denmark. Yet, in the public mind of our own and other countries, this monetary incentive must raise questions.

The incident is worth commenting on because it suggests a basic difficulty in psychological warfare techniques. Many of them require secrecy and should be carried out in a way which either disguises their source or makes possible an official disavowal. A large number of unorthodox means can be used to spread confusion in enemy ranks and to induce individuals to desert. But most of these should be kept in the dark and should certainly not be confused with national policy. It was probably necessary to make public declarations of the monetary rewards held out to Communist fliers, and favorable results may well justify the whole experiment. Nevertheless, it is unfortunate that the dollar sign has had to loom so large and so officially over military affairs.

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The following papers are attached:

- (1) Comments on the Agenda from the office of [REDACTED] 25X1
- (2) WE Division comments on the Report of the 22 April LENAP Committee (which is attached). Particular Agenda items are sidelined. 25X1
- (3) [REDACTED] letter on th [REDACTED] together wit [REDACTED] by PP. 25X1
- (4) Newspaper comment on the MIG offer.
- (5) Memorandum on the interrogation of U. S. prisoner of war returnees. This is the item which [REDACTED] will raise as a matter of "other business". 25X1
- (6) Memorandum from Mr. Wisner on an item to be discussed with [REDACTED] 25X1

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## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

**INSTRUCTIONS:** Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

**FROM:**

**PP/PP/Plans, 1309 K**

**NO.**

**DATE**

**ILLEGIB**

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
[Redacted]					[Redacted]
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